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dership consist of preventing this decline from occurring’ (Murphy, 2010: 
243). 
(9) The disaster favored various forms of self-organization. Activists were 
forced to act regardless official instructions, sometimes coming into collision 
with strict instructions of federal forces, that is, of the state rescuers and lo-
cal administration. 
(10) it is indicative that during the struggle with fire and then rendering as-
sistance to injured or psychologically depressed there were no one conflict 
between people of different nationalities. All involved, be it volunteers or 
local residents, worked (and suffered) equally. 
(11) their motivation and at the same time mobilizing frame was ‘we are 
needed!’, that is, their activity was claiming and necessary for others. In 
other words, their collective efforts aimed at the protection of a common 
good were again claimed by the society. 
(12) the most important result of this hot Russian summer was the exposition 
of absolutely useless of the new Forestry Code adopted in 2005 and some 
other laws related to forestry and forestry business in particular. 
(13) looking more widely, we agree with our western partners that ‘the inter-
net is an efficient tool in terms of the diffusion of protest (Della Porta et al., 
1999) and the consistency of protest, in order to achieve a ‘consensual mobi-
lization’ (Olitrault, 2001: 124, quotation from: Win de Donk et al., 2004: 
171).  
 
7. Political and scientific and institutions 
Surprisingly, but the critical situation under review had for a long time no 
any response from the part of central, regional and local authorities. Fires 
quickly expanded, smog covered Moscow, its residents suffocated, but it 
seemed that politicians of all levels and ranks have heard nothing about all 
this including the President’s administration and former Moscow mayor. No 
measures were taken in order to alleviate the sufferings of sick and old. The 
situation were worse than in New Orleans. Nevertheless, official media re-
ported that ‘All under control’. There are some explanations of this aliena-
tion, but the key of them meant that it was one more confirmation that power 
incapsulated and did not want to show its interest to lay people’s fatigue 
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even in critical circumstances. All warnings made in advance by research 
institutes and monitoring organizations were disregarded.  Besides alienation 
mentioned above, there is one more explanation of weakness of power. ‘Or-
ganizations that had been rational and efficient under normal dynamics of 
nature were now having great  difficulty coping with its extreme movements. 
The severe weather exposed modern society as fragile. Previously, nature 
has seemed reduced to benign recreation, but now it appeared threatening 
and filled with danger’. (Murphy, 2010: 88-89). Only some king of busi-
nesses celebrated because the prices for all could make cool – ventilators, 
conditioners, sun-screens and the like – jumping up every day. 
As to academics, they divided in two parts. A majority of professors and 
instructors of high schools (with their children and relatives) simply run 
away from zones of fire and smog, and calmly continued their relaxation 
abroad. Only by the command from the top some of them as well as regional 
and local executives were forced to return to suffering cities and towns. On 
the contrary, the minority of academics, mainly involved in nature protec-
tion, took part in aid and rescue operations at once. They worked not only as 
consultants or experts, but did any rescue work which was needed in a par-
ticular place. As I confirmed empirically, the old tradition of Russian scien-
tists khozdenie v narod (going to people) had been revitalized (Yanitsky, 
2005). But there is another explanation of their activity: many of them had 
bought dachas (shale) in devastated rural villages, and therefore they de-
fended from fires not only a common good but their private property. 
 
8. On shortcomings of rescue operations 
Since we, sociologists, had been insiders and practiced bottom—up view, 
some deficits and mistakes of official organizations responsible for rescue 
became clearly seen. Firstly, the impact on political and economic processes 
underline a disaster had been not investigated (for example, a local adminis-
tration functions or building materials). Rescue organizers first looking at the 
aid operation itself. Then, the rescuers has no a rehabilitation program. Their 
operations were restricted by prevention fire of houses of local inhabitants, 
only. There were no programs of their further security, food supply, etc. 
They did not know the state of art of targeted population before the begin-
ning of disaster and aid intervention. Neither municipal authorities nor res-
cuers did not know how many people were actually needed in aid and medi-
